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Abstract
Technological leadership has shifted at various times from one country to another.
We propose a mechanism that explains this perpetual cycle of technological leapfrog-
ging in a two-country model including the dynamic optimization of an innitely-lived
consumer. In the model, each country accumulates knowledge stock over time because
of domestic innovation and spillovers from foreign innovation. We show that if the in-
ternational knowledge spillovers are reasonably e¢ cient, technological leadership may
shift rst from one country to another, and then alternate between countries along an
equilibrium path.
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1 Introduction
Throughout history, technological leadership has shifted at various times from one country
to another. For instance, during the early 17th century, Venice and Spanish Lombardy were
among the technologically most advanced regions in Europe (Davids 2008, p. 2). Over the
centuries, the technological center of gravity of Europe then moved, residing at various times
in Italy, southern Germany, the Netherlands, France, England, and then again in Germany
(Mokyr 1990, p. 207). Some economic historians even claim that the US had begun to lose
its technological leadership as early as the early 1990s (Nelson and Wright 1992).
An important question is why such economic and technological leapfrogging takes place.
An equally fundamental question is why technological leapfrogging has repeatedly occurred.
The rst question has been investigated in existing literature, in which technological leapfrog-
ging is seen as been triggered by major exogenous changes in technology (Brezis, Krugman,
and Tsiddon 1993).1 In contrast, the cause of perpetual cycles in technological leapfrogging
has scarcely been studied. While we may regard the perpetual cycles of leapfrogging as
responses to the perpetual exogenous changes in technology, this explanation is essentially
based on exogenous macro shocks in technology. The present paper o¤ers an alternative
explanation.
This paper develops a theory that explains the perpetual cycle in technological leader-
ship as a market-driven equilibrium phenomenon that is free from exogenous shocks. For
this purpose, we develop a new growth model that can capture in a tractable manner the
process by which national technological leadership moves between countries along an equi-
librium dynamic path. In doing so, we focus on endogenous innovation and international
spillovers in a two-country setting with the dynamic optimization of consumption and saving
by an innitely-lived consumer. As the rms in a country develop innovations by investing
resources, a knowledge stock accumulates in the home country, and this subsequently but
only partially contributes to the accumulation of foreign knowledge because of international
spillovers through foreign direct investment (FDI).2
By regarding technological leadership as the state whereby a given country develops the
most innovations among all countries, we demonstrate that technological leadership by that
country may shift to another country and then may alternate perpetually between countries.
Specically, we obtain two main results. (a) If the fundamental protability of innovation is
low, only the leading country innovates in equilibrium. In this case, leapfrogging never takes
place. (b) If the fundamental protability of innovation is su¢ ciently high, both leading and
lagging countries engage in innovation. In this case, technological leadership can shift over
time and will perpetually move back and forth between countries along an equilibrium path
if international knowledge spillovers are reasonably e¢ cient.
1See also Ohyama and Jones (1995), Motta, Thisse, and Cabrales (1997), Brezis and Tsiddon (1998),
van de Klundert and Smulders (2001), and Desmet (2002). The present paper essentially di¤ers from those
analyses in its focus on perpetual cycles of leapfrogging, thus complementing these works by clarifying the
intrinsically cyclical nature of national technological leadership.
2As argued by Brezis (1995), foreign capital plays a role in industrialization and development processes.
We may also accept that international capital ows, as well as imports, are important channels for inter-
national knowledge spillovers, as discussed in the literature (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Feenstra 1996).
See Branstetter (2006) for recent empirical evidence.
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What we call the fundamental protability of innovation is a composite of parameters
that positively a¤ects the equilibrium prot a rm earns from an innovation. This composite
parameter completely determines into which case the world economy falls in equilibrium,
namely, case (a), wherein only the leader innovates, or case (b), wherein both countries can
innovate. We may think that we have experienced both regimes and transitions from one
to the other. If we use the theory developed in the present paper to explain this, we may
regard such regime transition as the result of an exogenous change in the parameters a¤ecting
the fundamental protability of innovation. The implication is that a lagging country can
leapfrog the leading country only when the fundamental protability of innovation is high,
which is when the lagging country can innovate in equilibrium.
The key driving force behind perpetual leapfrogging is the ability of a country to learn
from foreign innovations. For example, a lagging country may learn much more from for-
eign innovations developed in a leading country than the leading country learns from those
developed in the lagging country. Meanwhile, domestic innovations occur and build each
countrys knowledge stock. The analysis formally shows that leapfrogging is possible only
when both countries innovate, where the lagging country has a dual engine of knowledge
growth consisting of domestic innovation and foreign innovation di¤used by spillovers. If a
country can learn e¢ ciently from di¤used foreign innovations, technological leadership will
perpetually alternate between countries. We can easily elaborate on why both countries
innovate in equilibrium; the fundamental protability of innovation can be su¢ ciently high,
so that innovation pays even for the technologically lagging country. When the fundamen-
tal protability is low, however, the lagging country does not innovate but simply receives
spillovers from foreign innovation, resulting in a scenario where no leapfrogging occurs. This
implies that the spillovers themselves can, at most, make the lagging country as innovative
as, but not more innovative than, the leading country.
In addition to the leapfrogging cycles, leadership in (outward) FDI also shifts between
countries since the technologically leading country is a foreign direct investor country in
equilibrium in the model. Such a cycle in FDI, accompanied by leapfrogging cycles in
technology, can be regarded as consistent with the fact that leadership in FDI has continually
shifted in the real world. For example, the UK was the most active foreign direct investor
country at the beginning of the 20th century, a role that shifted to the US by the middle of
the century (Twomey 2000, p. 33, Table 3.2). Regarding an estimate for foreign investments
including portfolios as a proxy of the amount of FDI (given that historical data on FDIs are
not widely available), we can conrm that such foreign-investment leapfrogging took place by
referring to Obsfeld and Taylor (2004, p. 523, Table 2.1). In addition, given that the ow
of capital from Holland to Great Britain, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth
century, is well documented(Brezis 1995), we can conjecture that the Netherlands would
exhibit foreign-investment leadership before the UK. On the basis of these facts, one might
think that leadership in FDI also uctuates between countries. It is also worth noting that
historically, the directions of technological leadership movement may seem similar to that
of foreign-investment leadership movement (e.g., the UK to the US). This is consistent with
our theoretical prediction.3
3A time lag can be seen in history, in which the technologically leading country is not necessarily the
most active foreign direct investor country in the same period. A formal investigation of such a time lag is
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The endogenous occurrence of perpetual leapfrogging is not new in the context of price
competition between rms. For instance, the important paper by Giovannetti (2001) con-
siders a duopoly in which rms considering innite technological adoption set prices with
Bertrand competition in the product market. Using this model, Giovannetti identies the
conditions whereby rms alternate in adopting the new technology, thereby representing a
leapfrogging process. He shows that demand conditions, such as price elasticities, play a role
in determining whether leapfrogging can be perpetual in Bertrand competition. Lee, Kim,
and Lim (2011) have provided recent empirical support for this contention. In addition,
some studies in the eld of economic geography address both the theory of and empirical
evidence for technological leapfrogging at the regional level (for example, Quah 1996a, b).4
Di¤erent from the context of price competition, the present paper assumes that rms are
monopolistically competitive as in the standard endogenous growth model (Romer 1990).
Thus, there is no strategic interaction in the process of innovation, FDI, and pricing.5
The present study relates to the literature on innovation and growth cycles. In order to
capture the cyclical growth phenomena in the simplest fashion, we follow Shleifer (1986),
Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi (1999), and Matsuyama (1999,
2001) by assuming that patents last only for a single period in a discrete time model. This
assumption implies that a single period is su¢ ciently long, which can be somewhere around
20 years. Given that in reality, many innovated consumption goods become obsolete before
their patents expire, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that innovations become obsolete
within a single period (which is fairly long). In line with these studies, which address neither
leapfrogging nor its cycle, we assume the temporary nature of the monopoly enjoyed by
innovators, which plays a role in explaining leapfrogging cycles in the growth process.6
In relation to this, in the present study, we view leapfrogging cycles as a discrete phe-
nomenon.7 This is in line with the literature on nonlinear equilibrium dynamics, in which
a discrete-time growth model is commonly used for explaining complicated, real-world cy-
cles (Nishimura and Yano 2008). Given that innovations often come in a cluster (Shleifer
1986), we believe that the discrete-time model can be a reasonable choice for explaining
innovation-driven cycles such as leapfrogging in our model, although it is also essential to
address this issue in a continuous-time setting as in Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), who
explain endogenous growth cycles in a continuous-time model of Schumpeterian growth.8
This study makes an important contribution to the theoretical literature by developing
a new growth model with the dynamic optimization of an innitely-lived consumer that can
left for future work.
4See Athreye and Godley (2009), Giovannetti (2013), and Petrakos, Rodríguez-Pose, and Rovolis (2005)
for more recent research. In the political economy literature, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996) provide an
endogenous explanation for a long cycle of stagnation and growth, similar to perpetual leapfrogging in the
present paper, by focusing on vested interests in determining policies. See also Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and
Vickers (2001) for perpetual leapfrogging at the rm level.
5See, for example, Hall (2008) and Harrington, Iskhakov, Rust, and Schjerning (2010) for research on
dynamic strategic interaction in the competitive process.
6See also Iwaisako and Tanaka (2012) for endogenous cycles in a NorthSouth product-cycle model with
overlapping generations, in which innovation and imitation interact with each other to generate perpetual
uctuations in the world growth rate. However, leapfrogging does not exist in their model.
7See the discussion at the end of Section 3.3 on the use of a discrete-time model. See also footnote 14.
8See also Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2008, 2009, 2013) for related studies.
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explicitly capture how the (relative) national leadership in cutting-edge technology moves
between countries over time along an equilibrium path. The beauty of the present model lies
in its theoretical tractability and its ability to capture the main insights of the leapfrogging
cycles in a simple setup, in which the equilibrium dynamical system is derived from the model
as an autonomous one-dimensional system that allows us to track and explicitly illustrate an
entire equilibrium path of national technological leadership between countries for any initial
condition by means of a tractable phase diagram analysis. We achieve this by developing
a new growth model that combines four standard elements: endogenous innovation, FDI,
knowledge spillovers, and one-period patent length. In addition, the result is also novel to
the existing literature on leapfrogging in demonstrating the intrinsically cyclical nature of
national technological leadership; in our model, technological leadership perpetually uctu-
ates between countries on an equilibrium path. No research has addressed the equilibrium
trajectory of national technological leadership or demonstrated the existence of perpetual
cycles between countries.
2 Model
Time is discrete and extends from  1 to +1. Consider two countries, A and B; which
have identical preferences and production and R&D technologies, di¤ering only in their initial
levels of innovation productivity. The countries are denoted by i or f (i = A; B; f = A; B),
using a superscript for variables pertaining to the production side and a subscript for those
pertaining to the consumption side.
There is a continuum of di¤erentiated consumption goods in each period t. Each good
is indexed by j. We follow the research and development (R&D)-based endogenous growth
model with expanding variety (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991) by assuming
innovation as generating new varieties of goods. Given that we later allow for FDI, the
country where a particular rm innovates and manufactures may change. Let  i(t) be the
set of goods that are innovated in country i in period t, and let i(t) be the set of goods
manufactured in country i in period t.
2.1 Consumption
In each country, an innitely lived representative consumer inelastically supplies L units of
labor for production and R&D in every period. Note that the two countries are assumed to
have equal labor forces, L. Each consumer is endowed with the same intertemporal utility
function
Ui =
1X
t=0
t lnui(t);
where  2 (0; 1) is the time preference rate. Temporary utility ui(t) is dened on the set
fA(t) [ B(t)g of goods manufactured in both countries (free trade), taking the standard
DixitStiglitz form:
ui(t) =
Z
j2fA(t)[B(t)g
xi(j; t)
1 dj
 1
1 
; (1)
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where xi(j; t) is the consumption of good j in country i. Parameter  2 (0; 1) denotes an in-
verse measure of the elasticity of substitution. Let Ei(t) 
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g p(j; t)xi(j; t)dj be
the spending in country i, where p(j; t) denotes the price of good j: Solving the utility maxi-
mization problem in (1) leads to the demand function for good j, xi(j; t) = p(j; t) (1=)Ei(t)=P (t)1 (1=),
where P (t) is the price index.9 Aggregating these expressions, we obtain the derived aggre-
gate demand, xA(j; t) + xB(j; t)  x(j; t), as
x(j; t) =
E(t)p(j; t) (1=)
P (t)1 (1=)
; (2)
where E(t) = EA(t) + EB(t) is the aggregate spending in period t. The price elasticity of
demand is constant at  1 for any j.
Solving the dynamic optimization of the consumers utility for consumption and saving
decisions under the intertemporal budget constraint results in the usual Euler equation
Ei(t+ 1)=Ei(t) = (1 + r(t)), where r(t) is the interest rate in period t. We obtain
E(t+ 1)
E(t)
= (1 + r(t)): (3)
2.2 Innovation, FDI, and manufacture
A single rm innovates and monopolistically supplies each di¤erentiated consumption good,
following the standard endogenous growth framework (Romer 1990).10 Innovating a new
good takes one period. In each period, say t   1; a rm in country i can innovate one
technology to produce a new di¤erentiated good at the end of the period; t  1; by investing
1=Ki(t   1)  ki(t   1) units of domestic labor in R&D activity.11 Here Ki(t   1) denotes
the technology level in innovation for country i in period t   1; and innovation is achieved
entirely via domestic labor resources (no R&D outsourcing). In the subsequent period t; the
rm will set up a production plant. In doing this, the rm can choose the country in which to
manufacture the good in order to maximize monopolistic prots. In equilibrium, as foreign
prots may be greater, the rm may transfer production to a foreign country through FDI.
This is the channel for innovation di¤usion in our model.12
9As is well known, the index is dened as P (t) =
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g p(j; t)
1 (1=)dj
 1
1 (1=)
.
10As Romer (1990) explains, this simplied setting is only a convenience since (w)hether the owner of the
patent manufactures the good itself or licenses others to do so, it can extract the same monopoly prot.One
potential oversimplifying factor here is the lack of explicit and costly adoption of innovation, which should
be a limiting factor for the analysis in a broader context. While a complete analysis on costly innovation
adoption is beyond the scope of this paper, we can incorporate a process of costly adoption of innovation
without essentially changing the results by using a very simple setting; see Appendix C (not for publication).
11Following the literature (Romer 1990, Matsuyama 1999), we consider a deterministic innovation process
for the sake of simplicity, although without any qualitative change in our results, we can consider a simple
stochastic innovation process in which success probability for a rm to innovate a new good is endogenous
and increases with the rms R&D investment (see Appendix C (not for publication)). However, if we assume
that the time for each innovation to be completed was not xed at one period but was stochastic, the analysis
becomes intractable. We leave the question of how such stochastic timing of innovation impacts leapfrogging
for future research.
12In line with the literature on international trade and growth (Lai 1998), we do not distinguish between
the various forms of production transfer, including fully and partly owned subsidiaries and licensing.
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We assume a simple production technology. There are constant returns to scale in the
production of any good j and the productivity of labor is the same in both countries, which
is normalized to be one.13 The marginal cost in country i is thus equal to the wage rate in
country i, wi(t). When the rm chooses to manufacture in country i in period t; captured
by j 2 i(t); it produces x(j; t) units of good j by using labor in country i: The standard
prot maximization problem is written as
max
(p(j;t); x(j;t))
(j; t) = p(j; t)x(j; t)  wi(t)x(j; t)
subject to the market demand function (2). Since, by (2), the price elasticity of each good
j is constant at 1=; the rm sets a monopolistic price of p(j; t) = wi(t)=(1  )  pi(t). By
substituting this into (2), we obtain the demand and prot functions as
x(j; t) =
E(t)pi(t) (1=)
P (t)1 (1=)
 xi(t) (4)
and
(j; t) = E(t)

pi(t)
P (t)
1 (1=)
 i(t) (5)
for j 2 i(t) (i = A; B). As rms prefer the country where prots are higher, the discounted
present value of the rm innovating in country i in period t  1 is expressed as
V i(t  1) = maxf
A(t); B(t)g
1 + r(t  1)   w
i(t  1) ki(t  1): (6)
In order to capture cyclical phenomena in the simplest fashion, we follow Shleifer (1986),
Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi (1999) and Matsuyama (1999,
2001) by assuming that patents last only for one period.14 This assumption implies that
the length of a unit period is su¢ ciently long, which can be around 20 years, in keeping
with the duration of real-world patents. Given that in reality, many innovated consumption
goods become obsolete before their patents expire, we may assume that innovations are made
obsolete within a single period (which in our model is fairly long).15 As shown below, this
13Here we simply consider that e¢ ciency in manufacturing normalizes across countries. We can extend
this simple setting by allowing for country-specic manufacturing e¢ ciency and endogenous technological
progress. In such an extended model, we can easily verify that the comparative advantage between R&D
and manufacturing (rather than the absolute advantage in R&D) plays an important role in perpetual
leapfrogging, although there is no fundamental change in the results and their implications for perpetual
leapfrogging.
14This assumption implies that all patents start and expire at the same time, although in reality patents
overlap. We may deal with this undesirable property by interpreting the length of a period as very long
(e.g., 40 years) and dividing each period into subperiods (e.g., two 20-year periods), although we need a
continuous-time model to completely x this problem. In the present paper, we view leapfrogging as a
discrete-time phenomenon and leave this issue for future work.
15This assumption may also be justied if each innovation is interpreted as fairly specic. For example,
innovation in this model would be represented by the specic innovation associated with iPhone 4S or
smartphones instead of cell phones or information technology more generally.
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assumption makes the analysis tractable without any fundamental change in the results.16
Finally, free entry guarantees that the net value of a rm is not positive in equilibrium:
V i(t  1)  0 for each i.
2.3 Knowledge accumulation and spillovers
Technology in innovation Ki(t) advances with knowledge accumulation. Following Romer
(1990), we assume intertemporal knowledge spillovers in innovation: current innovations
contribute to the accumulation of the stock of knowledge Ki(t), with which the cost of
innovation, ki(t) = 1=Ki(t); reduces over time. Here, as is standard, the technology level in
innovation Ki(t) is interpreted as the knowledge stock in innovation.
The knowledge stock of a country consists of cumulative innovations of two types: home
and foreign innovations. Dene
N i(t) 
Z
 i(t)
dj and M i(t) 
Z
j2 f (t 1)\i(t)
dj: (7)
Here, N i(t) denotes the number of innovations developed in country i in period t and M i(t)
denotes the number of products that are innovated in period t  1 in country f (f 6= i) and
then ow into country i from country f in period t. Following Romer (1990), we assume
that the knowledge stock Ki(t) linearly depends on the sum of domestic innovations that are
developed up to the beginning of period t; i.e., N i(t  1) +N i(t  2) +   ; where N i(s) is a
familiar proxy for the ow of knowledge generated as a by-product of the innovations achieved
in period s. We also assume that the international knowledge spillovers as an externality
accompany FDI, such that each country learns from its foreign innovation inows. Hence the
knowledge stock of country i also depends on the sum,M i(t 1)+M i(t 2)+: Accordingly,
we describe the knowledge stock using
Ki(t) =
tX
s= 1
 
N i(s  1) + M i(s  1) with   1; (8)
where the parameter  2 [0; 1] captures the e¢ ciency of the contribution of international
knowledge spillovers through foreign innovation inows to knowledge accumulation and thus
technological progress occurs. The e¢ ciency of international knowledge spillovers increases
with . If  = 1, spillovers are as e¢ cient as domestic spillovers; if  = 0, there is no
learning at all from foreign innovations. For the sake of explanation, we rewrite (8) as a ow
as follows
Ki(t+ 1) Ki(t) = N i(t) + M i(t): (9)
Considering (9), one may conjecture that spillovers M i(t) by themselves can cause a
reversal of Ki(t) > Kf (t): Ki(t + 1) < Kf (t + 1) might hold by taking a su¢ ciently large
M f (t): Leapfrogging may be able to occur simply through spilloverM f (t) from country i to f:
However, this conjecture is not the case with the present model because the example (of such
16Note that, in the next subsection, we assume that obsolete innovations stay alive in the sense that
they continue to contribute to the current knowledge stock, although they are not explicitly traded in the
marketplace. Whether they are traded or not is not important for our main story explained later.
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a large M f (t)) is not consistent with (8) and (9) for the following reason. Equation (8) says
that innovation in country i; N i(t 1); not only contributes to the foreign knowledge; Kf (t+
1); through spillovers ofM f (t)(= N i(t 1)) but also increases the domestic knowledge Ki(t)
in the previous period. Therefore, it is not possible to arbitrarily take a large M f (t) with
Ki(t) constant. As M f (t) becomes large, by (8), Ki(t) and Ki(t+1) must also become large
at a higher rate than, or at least the same rate as, Kf (t + 1) does. We cannot articially
make Ki(t + 1) < Kf (t + 1) by controlling M f (t) only. As we will see later, a su¢ cient
number of domestic innovations, N f (t); is essential for the reversal of Ki(t) > Kf (t) (i.e.,
leapfrogging). In summary, so long as we choose an identical equilibrium path, spillovers
M f (t) by themselves cannot cause a reversal of Ki(t) > Kf (t):
It is also worth pointing out that in (8) and (9), we assume that knowledge develops
horizontally, rather than vertically. That is, we assume that knowledge accumulates as
innovations are added to old innovations, not as innovations replace old innovations. Under
this horizontal modeling of knowledge accumulation, a countrys knowledge stock can be
related to a collection of blueprints for the country, i.e., how many goods the country
knows how to produce. In addition, di¤erent countries innovate along di¤erent lines. This
captures the fact that technologies or products made in di¤erent countries are sometimes
at least slightly di¤erentiated. Thus, the knowledge stock of country i can accumulate as
foreign innovations (M i(t)) simply add to, rather than replace, domestic innovations (N i(t)).
Although the results would become richer if the model also included the replacement of
technologies or a knowledge stock as a vertical ladder, in this study, we focus on the above-
mentioned horizontal aspect of knowledge with (8) and (9), which can help us highlight our
main point.17
3 Technological Leadership in Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section, we prove the main result that technological leadership may endogenously
uctuate over time, thereby perpetually moving back and forth between countries along an
equilibrium path. Before proceeding, we provide a formal denition of the concept of tech-
nological leadership. Taking into account the notion in economic history (Davids 2008),18
we refer to a country that develops the most innovations among the countries as the techno-
logical leader, and to a country that develops few innovations as a lagging country. In the
present model, and as will be made apparent later, this denition implies leadership as the
state whereby a given country has the highest innovation productivity among the countries,
which is consistent with the denition in existing literature. Thus, in equilibrium, country
17One method for vertically capturing knowledge accumulation within the present setting is to consider
obsolescence of knowledge by assuming that knowledge accumulates as innovations partially replace old
innovations, rather than simply being added to old innovations as in (8). For example, we can introduce a
rate of knowledge destruction, say  2 [0; 1]; into (8), with which (9) would be revised to Ki(t+1) Ki(t) =
N i(t) + M i(t)  Ki(t): As long as the two countries have identical ; we can demonstrate that our main
result is robust to this extension. Otherwise, it would be possible to show a result similar to that of the
present paper in a quality-ladder variant of the present model; see Appendix D (not for publication) for a
formal explanation.
18Davids (2008) considered that a country that has technological leadership plays an initiating role in the
development of new technologies across a wide variety of elds.
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i innovates more if and only if its innovation productivity is higher; N i(t) > N f (t) if and
only if Ki(t) > Kf (t): For simplicity, we use Ki(t) > Kf (t) to designate country i as the
technological leader, and we refer to any reversal of the leading position as technological
leapfrogging.
Without loss of generality, we assume that country A is the leading country in period
t, KA(t) > KB(t) (and thus NA(t) > NB(t) to be shown in equilibrium), and we refer to
this situation as regime A. If KA(t) < KB(t) (and thus NA(t) < NB(t) to be shown in
equilibrium), we refer to it as regime B.
In any period, this model can be regarded as a variant of a conventional two-good Ri-
cardian model, where the two outputs considered are innovation and production. Given
KA(t) > KB(t), there are potentially three possible specialization patterns in period t:19
(1) one in which both countries engage in manufacturing and only one country engages in
R&D, (2) one in which both countries engage in R&D and only one country engages in
manufacturing, and (3) one in which both countries are specialized. It is useful to dene a
new variable, N(t) =
R
j2fA(t)[B(t)g dj; which is the total number of goods manufactured in
t, satisfying N(t) = NA(t  1) +NB(t  1):
Let us explain the essential role of FDI in how the economy endogenously falls into
each pattern in the pre-equilibrium process, that is, the process through which the economy
reaches equilibrium. Suppose that a wage di¤erential between the countries exists on an
o¤-equilibrium path, say wA(t) > wB(t): In lagging country B; wages are lower and thus
prots are higher. This gives rise to an arbitrage opportunity; rms in leading country A
sequentially engage in FDI and move to lagging country B for higher prots. This gradually
increases the labor demand by manufacturing in lagging country B; which in turn generates
a continual increase in the wage rate in lagging country B, wB(t):
Three possibilities exist. (1) One possibility is that wB(t) continues to increase until
it is equal to the wage rate in leading country A; wA(t); in which case wages are inter-
nationally equated in equilibrium wA(t) = wB(t); whereupon some rms stay and pro-
duce goods in leading country A; while the other rms shift their production to lagging
country B: This situation corresponds to pattern (1), in which both countries engage in
manufacturing and R&D investment is always unprotable for lagging country B because
the technological gap KA(t) > KB(t) with wA(t) = wB(t) generates an R&D cost gap
wA(t)=KA(t) < wB(t)=KB(t): (2) Another possibility is that the wage di¤erential remains
when all rms move to lagging country B. In this case, leading country As wage rate is
higher even in equilibrium, wA(t) > wB(t): Lagging country B uses this cost advantage to
engage in R&D if the technology gap KA(t) > KB(t) is not too large, in which case both
countries engage in R&D. This represents the specialization pattern (2).20 Finally, in case
(3), if the technology gap KA(t) > KB(t) is su¢ cient, the net benet of innovation cannot
be positive for lagging country B despite it having the cost advantage, wA(t) > wB(t). This
corresponds to the last possibility relating to pattern (3). In what follows, we formally con-
rm those processes by deriving the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the pattern into
19The model contains no zero-innovation equilibrium because the so-called Inada property is assumed in
the constant elasticity of substitution utility function (1), which is standard in the literature.
20Specialization pattern (2) implies that in equilibrium, the technology gap (KA(t)=KB(t)) is exactly
equal to the wage ratio (wA(t)=wB(t)); otherwise, the countries would not be both engaging in R&D.
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which the economy falls in equilibrium.
3.1 No Leapfrogging
We investigate the specialization pattern (1) where both countries produce goods in equilib-
rium. First, we will derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition under which both countries
manufacture goods in equilibrium. Then, we will demonstrate that leapfrogging can never
take place in this equilibrium.
When both countries produce goods in equilibrium, as explained above, the wage rates
must be equated in equilibrium since any manufacturing rm would go to either country
through FDI if there remains a wage di¤erential. Thus, wA(t) = wB(t) = w(t) must hold
in equilibrium for the pattern (1), implying pi(t) = p(t) and thus xi(t) = x(t) by (4).
Then, due the technology gap KA(t) > KB(t); the cost for innovation is always lower in
leading country A; i.e., w(t)=KA(t) < w(t)=KB(t). As a result, only leading country A
innovates;  A(t) 6= ; and  B(t) = ;: By (7), we have NA(t) > 0 and NB(t) = 0. By
N(t + 1) = NA(t) + NB(t); we also have N(t + 1) = NA(t): As this situation is similar to
the NorthSouth product-cycle model à la Krugman (1979) and Helpman (1993) where only
the North innovates and both the North and the South manufacture, we may refer to this
pattern as a NorthSouth regime.21
Because leading country A innovates in equilibrium, the free-entry condition requires
V A(t) = 0 in equilibrium. By incorporating wA(t) = wB(t) = w(t) into (6), it also requires
V B(t) < 0 in equilibrium. Since pi(t) = p(t); using (5), the discounted present value of an
innovation in country i in (6) can be expressed as
V i(t) =
1
1 + r(t)
E(t+ 1)
N(t+ 1)
  wi(t) ki(t): (10)
Substituting into (10) the Euler equation 1+r(t) = E(t+1)= (E(t)) from (3), the free-entry
condition V A(t) = 0 > V B(t) becomes
E(t)
N(t+ 1)
= w(t) kA(t) < w(t) kB(t): (11)
The rst equality in (11) ensures that the discounted value of an innovation (E(t)=NA(t))
and the cost (w(t) kA(t)) are balanced in leading country A. The second inequality in (11)
simply means that the cost of an innovation is lower in the leading country (w(t)kA(t)) than
in the lagging country B (w(t)kB(t)).
The labor market-clearing conditions for country i is given by
L =
Z
 i(t)
ki(t)dj +
Z
i(t)
xi(t)dj: (12)
21Here, we assume that the North is a country that innovates; however, if the North (the South) was dened
as a country where the wage rate is higher (lower) as is also usual in the literature, these North/South labels
could be misleading. Nevertheless, we use these labels because we can easily control the international wage
di¤erential in the present model by incorporating into the model an international di¤erential in manufacturing
productivity.
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The quantity of a good, xi(t); can be derived from (4) and (7) as xi(t) = (1 )E(t)= (w(t)N(t))
for each i: Together with this, by eliminating the country index i from (12),22 we can obtain
the world labor constraint as
2L = NA(t) kA(t) + (1  )E(t)
w(t)
; (13)
in which  B(t) = ; is used. The left-hand side in (13) is the world supply of labor, and the
right-hand side is the world demand for labor from both the innovation sector in leading
country A and the manufacturing sectors in both countries.
In order to determine the equilibrium ow of innovation made in period t; we will elim-
inate the term E(t)=w(t) from the world labor market-clearing condition (13), using the
free-entry condition (11). Then, noting kA(t) = 1=KA(t) and N(t+ 1) = NA(t), the ow of
innovation in period t is derived as
NA(t) = KA(t)
2L
1 + 
and NB(t) = 0; (14)
where  is a composite of the parameters  and : The formal denition of  is given by
  
1   : (15)
The parameter  captures the discounted present value of a markup ratio (i.e., the ratio of
price to marginal cost) for the rm,23 which increases with time preference  and decreases
with the elasticity of substitution  1:24 Since parameter  positively a¤ects equilibrium
prots from innovating a good, we refer to it as an innovations fundamental protability.
Note that the equilibrium prot itself is endogenously determined with other endogenous
variables, and it changes over time, although fundamental protability is exogenously given
by (15). Equation (14) shows that the innovation ow NA(t) increases with the knowledge
stock KA(t) and an innovations protability.
Now, we can derive the number of goods that are manufactured in each country. Noting
(12) with  B(t) = 0; we have L =
R
B(t)
xB(t)dj: Then, by (11) and (14), we obtainZ
A(t)
dj

=
1 
2
N(t) and
Z
B(t)
dj

=
1 + 
2
N(t): (16)
To ensure that leading country A manufactures goods in equilibrium, i.e.,
R
A(t)
dj > 0; it
must hold that
 < 1: (17)
The parameter condition (17) is more likely to hold when the time preference  is smaller
and the price elasticity of substitution  1 is higher. The condition (17) can be shown as
necessary and su¢ cient for an economy to fall within the NorthSouth regime.
22We do this by summing both sides of (12) over i:
23Note that the constant elasticity of substitution  1 is equal to the price elasticity of each good j; which
determines the markup ratio as 1=(1  ).
24Li (2001) argues that the evidence regarding whether there is any conventional value or a range of values
for the elasticity of substitution is inconclusive. For example, Broda and Weinstein (2006) show that the
elasticity of substitution is, on average, greater than two, but tends to decline over time and is actually less
than two in some sectors (e.g., motor vehicles).
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Lemma 1 The economy falls in the NorthSouth regime if and only if  < 1; in which both
countries produce goods and only the leading country innovates.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Why do both countries manufacture for  < 1? In other words, why are the equilibrium
wages internationally equated for  < 1? Recall the essential role of FDI explained at the
beginning of this section. An international wage di¤erential such as wA(t) > wB(t) could
exist, because the only source of an international wage di¤erential in the model is leading
country As advantage in R&D productivity, KA(t) > KB(t): As long as wA(t) > wB(t); a
rm in leading country A engages in FDI to shift their production to lower-wage country B;
which tightens labor resource scarcity in country B: As a result, the wage rate in lagging
country B; wB(t); gradually rises as the economy reaches equilibrium. Lemma 1 implies
that when the fundamental protability of innovation  is small (i.e.,  < 1), the potential
for an international wage gap is also small,25 and international wages can become equated
at the point in time at which some (not all) rms in leading country A move to lagging
country B through FDI. Ultimately, both countries manufacture, and only leading country
A innovates, as wA(t) = wB(t) naturally creates an R&D cost advantage for leader A; such
as wA(t)=KA(t) < wB(t)=KB(t):
Thus far, we have three important conditions. Inequality (17) is the necessary and su¢ -
cient condition for an economy to fall within the NorthSouth regime in equilibrium, under
which both countries produce goods and only the leading country innovates in equilibrium.
Equations (14) and (16) determine the innovation ow and the fractions of manufactured
goods, respectively, in the NorthSouth regime.
In what follows, we demonstrate that in the NorthSouth regime, leapfrogging never
occurs even if spillovers are completely e¢ cient ( = 1). By (14) and (9), the growth of
knowledge can be expressed as follows:
KA(t+ 1) =

2L
1 + 
+ 1

KA(t) (18)
and
KB(t+ 1) = MB(t) +KB(t); (19)
where MB(t) =
R
B(t)
dj = (1 + )N(t)=2 by (16).
As KA(t) is given by history, (18) fully determines the growth of knowledge in leading
country A. Apparently, (19) does not determine KB(t+ 1) without additional historical as-
sumptions because the amount of spilloversMB(t) = (1 + )N(t)=2 depends on the number
of goods N(t) = NA(t  1)+NB(t  1); which is determined by innovation activities under-
taken in the previous period, t 1. Nevertheless, as shown in our rst theorem, regardless of
past innovation activities, N i(s) for s  t  1, leapfrogging never occurs in the NorthSouth
regime.
25It is important to elaborate why the potential for an international wage di¤erential is larger when 
is larger. Given that the countries are identical except for Ki(t); the productivity gap in R&D (KA(t) >
KB(t)) is the only source for an international wage di¤erential in our model. Thus, the potential for
a wage di¤erential is is enhanced by a larger share of R&D investment, which naturally increases with
the fundamental protability of innovation : The larger the value of ; the larger the potential for an
international wage di¤erential.
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Theorem 1 (No leapfrogging with lower protability) Suppose that the fundamental
protability of an innovation  falls below 1: Then, under the innitely lived agents dynamic
optimization, only the leading country innovates in equilibrium (the North-South regime). In
this case, leapfrogging never takes place.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the parameter restriction  < 1 ensures that only the leading country
innovates. By (16), MB(t) = (1 + )N(t)=2: (a) Assume KA(t   1) > KB(t   1): By the
expression of NA(t  1) in (14), with KA(t  1) = NA(t  1) +KA(t) from (9), substituting
N(t) = NA(t  1) into (19) derives
KB(t+ 1) = KA(t)
L(1 + )
(2L+ 1) + 1
+KB(t): (20)
From (18) and (20), we can show thatKA(t+1) > KB(t+1) holds so long asKA(t) > KB(t);
noting  < 1 and  < 1: (b) Assume KA(t   1) < KB(t   1): By symmetry, noting
N(t) = NB(t  1), the analogous procedures derive
KB(t+ 1) =

L(1 + )
(2L+ 1) + 1
+ 1

KB(t): (21)
From (18) and (21), KA(t + 1) > KB(t + 1) holds so long as KA(t) > KB(t); given  < 1
and  < 1: This proves that KA(t) > KB(t) cannot be reversed for the subsequent period
when  < 1; regardless of whether either country was a leader in the previous period t  1:
We now elaborate upon the theories of why economies with lower fundamental protabil-
ity of innovation cannot experience leapfrogging. Leapfrogging can stem from two sources:
knowledge growth from domestic innovation and spillovers from foreign innovation. In this
regime, however, the lagging country (country B) only receives spillovers from MB(t); the
foreign innovations developed in the leading country (country A). No domestic innovations
are produced in the lagging country. Given that the leading country also gains from in-
novations MB(t) (which are included in KA(t)) even more e¢ ciently than, or at least as
e¢ ciently as, the lagging country, the spillovers alone can only make the lagging country as
innovative as, but not more innovative than, the leading country. Thus, leapfrogging never
occurs. As shown later, leapfrogging is possible only if the lagging country not only receives
spillovers from the leading country but also innovates by itself.
Why does only the leading country innovate when the fundamental protability is low
such that  < 1? We have already answered this question formally in this section; thus, it
now su¢ ces to provide an intuitive explanation. Since  = = (1  ) ; lower  is associated
with lower  and higher  1: A lower time preference  results in a higher interest rate r(t);
which decreases the discounted value of prot (t). A higher elasticity of substitution  1
implies a lower markup ratio (1=(1   )) and a lower prot (t): The inequality condition
 < 1 intuitively requires an innovations discounted value to be fairly low. That is, the
value is too low for lagging country B to innovate by itself. In other words, where the
fundamental protability of an innovation  (depending on time preference rate  and
elasticity of substitution  1) is higher, the discounted benet from an innovation would
be higher and thus innovation would be protable, even for rms in the lagging country.
Finally, we may summarize this by stating that when an innovation has low fundamental
protability, leapfrogging does not take place because the lagging country does not innovate.
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3.2 An illustration
To further illustrate the international dynamics of knowledge in the NorthSouth regime, we
assume that leading country A has retained leadership in the past; i.e., NA(s) > 0 = NB(s)
and thus KA(s) > KB(s) for s = t; t   1;   : This consideration is reasonable given that
Theorem 1 shows that leapfrogging never takes place. The growth of knowledge follows
(18) and (20) for any s  t: Dene  (t) = KA(t)=(KA(t) + KB(t)); which stands for the
knowledge ratio for country A:We can derive the dynamic system for  (t) as follows. Noting
KA(t) > KB(t),
 (t+ 1) =
(a1 + 1) (t)
1 + (a1 + a2) (t)
for  (t) 2 (0:5; 1); (22)
where a1 and a2 are positive numbers determined by ; ; and L:26 By applying the above
procedures to the case of  (t) 2 (0; 0:5) where country B is the leading country, we can
easily derive the following dynamic system:
 (t+ 1) =
(1  a2) (t) + a2
1 + (1   (t)) (a1 + a2) for  (t) 2 (0; 0:5): (23)
Note that a1 < 1 and a2 < 1 if  < 1: We thus can verify that so long as  < 1; the steady
state is unique and higher than 0:5 for (22) and lower than 0:5 for (23).
Figure 1 illustrates the phase diagram for systems (22) and (23) with their steady states,
 A and  

B. As shown, any path starting in the situation where country A (B) is the leading
country stably converges to a steady state;  (s) > (<)0:5 for all s > t if  (t) > (<)0:5: Thus,
this phase diagram shows that no leapfrogging occurs in the case where the fundamental
protability of an innovation is lower.
3.3 Leapfrogging cycles
We now consider situations where only the lagging country manufactures (specialization
patterns (2) and (3)). We demonstrate that these patterns are realized in equilibrium if and
only if the parameters satisfy  > 1. Then, we show that in this case, leapfrogging can take
place in equilibrium.
By Lemma 1, it is implied that only one country manufactures in equilibrium if and only
if  > 1. We can easily exclude the case where only leading country A manufactures.27
Therefore, in equilibrium, only the lagging country manufactures if and only if  > 1;
where a wage di¤erential such as wA(t)  wB(t) must exist as manufacturing rms in
lagging country B would go to leading country A if wA(t) < wB(t); thus, A(t) < B(t)
held. Because this gives the lagging country a cost advantage, there are two possibilities:
one where both countries innovate (pattern (2)) and another where only leading country A
innovates (pattern (3)).
26The formal denitions are:
a1  2L1+ and a2  L(1+)1+(2L+1) :
27Only leading country A produces goods if and only if wA(t) < wB(t): This implies wA(t)=KA(t) <
wB(t)=KB(t) with KA(t) > KB(t) in which only leading country A innovates. No labor demand exists in
lagging country B; which is inconsistent with the market clearing condition.
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We rst investigate pattern (3), where only leading country A innovates and only lag-
ging country B produces goods. For the sake of explanation, we may refer to this as a
full NorthSouth regime. Since innovation takes place only in leading country A in equi-
librium, the free entry condition must hold as 0 = V A(t) > V B(t): Since manufacturing
takes place only in lagging country B in equilibrium, a wage di¤erential must remain as
wA(t) < wB(t): Using these conditions (see the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A for de-
tails), the wage rate in the lagging country is derived by its labor market-clearing condi-
tion as wB(t) = (1  )E(t)=L; the wage rate in the leading country by the free entry
condition as wA(t) = KA(t)E(t)=NA(t); the innovation ow in leading country A as
NA(t) = LKA(t); and the innovation ow as NB(t) = 0. On the one hand, the free en-
try condition V A(t) > V B(t) implies wA(t)=KA(t) < wB(t)=KB(t) in equilibrium, which
can be rewritten as KA(t)=KB(t) > : On the other hand, the wage di¤erential condition
wA(t) > wB(t) can be rewritten as  > 1: Combining these two yields
KA(t)
KB(t)
>  > 1: (24)
Lemma 2 The economy falls in the full NorthSouth regime if and only if KA(t)=KB(t) >
 > 1; in which only the leading country innovates and only the lagging country produces
goods.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 implies that so long as  > 1; innovation is more protable and the potential for
an international wage di¤erential is greater (see footnote 25); the wage di¤erential wA(t) >
wB(t) must remain in equilibrium, in contrast with that in the NorthSouth case with
 < 1.28 By using this wage di¤erential wA(t) > wB(t), lagging country B can enter the
innovation market; however, this is not the case as long as leading country As technological
advantage KA(t)=KB(t) is larger than ; so that the R&D cost is still lower in leading
country A; i.e., wA(t)=KA(t) < wB(t)=KB(t):
Incorporating NA(t) = LKA(t) and NB(t) = 0 into (9), knowledge accumulation in the
full NorthSouth regime (where country A is assumed to be a leading country) is as follows:
KA(t+ 1) = (L+ 1)KA(t) and KB(t+ 1) = KB(t) + LKA(t): (25)
Using (24), we can demonstrate that the full NorthSouth regime is unstable in the following
sense.
Theorem 2 Suppose that the protability of an innovation  exceeds 1 and that the inter-
national technological gap KA(t)=KB(t) is larger than . Then, under dynamic optimization
by the innitely lived agent, only the leading country innovates and only the lagging country
manufactures (the full NorthSouth regime). In this case, leapfrogging never takes place in
equilibrium. Moreover, any equilibrium path of KA(t)=KB(t) starting from this regime con-
verges to the steady state within the regime if  < 1= and eventually moves beyond this
regime (i.e., KA(t)=KB(t) eventually becomes below ) if  > 1=:
28The answer to the question of why the equilibrium wage di¤erential between countries exists for  < 1
is similar and symmetric to that of the question why of the wages are equated for  < 1: See the discussion
after Lemma 1.
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Proof. By (24), the equilibrium system can be derived as
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
1 + (1 + )L (t)
: (26)
 (t + 1) > 0:5 always holds because  (t) > 0:5 by assumption, showing no leapfrogging in
this regime. Then, system (26) has a unique steady state equal to 1=(1 + ): The condition
KA(t)=KB(t) >  (Lemma 2) is equivalent to  (t) > =(1 + ). Therefore, if 1=(1 + ) >
=(1 + ); then the steady state exists in the full NorthSouth regime, which can be easily
shown as stable through a usual phase diagram analysis. Similarly, we can show that if
1=(1+) < =(1+); the steady state does not exist within the regime;  (t) decreases over
time and eventually becomes below . Note that 1=(1 + ) > =(1 + ) implies  < 1=:
Next, we investigate the most important case (2), in which both countries innovate and
only the lagging country produces goods. Since innovation takes places in both countries,
the free-entry condition requires V A(t) = V B(t) = 0 in equilibrium, which directly implies
wA(t)=KA(t) = wB(t)=KB(t) by (6). In this case, it holds that NA(t) > 0; NB(t) > 0, and
N(t + 1) = NA(t) + NB(t): For conveniences sake, we refer to this specialization pattern
as a NorthNorth regime. Substituting the Euler equation (3) into the value of innovation
(10), the free-entry condition V A(t) = V B(t) = 0 implies
E(t)
N(t+ 1)
= wA(t)kA(t) = wB(t)kB(t): (27)
The interpretation of (27) is similar to that of (11). The second equality in (27) indicates
that the cost of an innovation becomes internationally equated in equilibrium.
To determine the innovation ows in the present case,we apply A(t) = ; to the labor
condition (12) in order to obtain
NA(t) = LKA(t): (28)
By using (4) and monopolistic pricing pB(t) = wB= (1  ), we obtain xB(t) = (1 )E(t)=(N(t)wB(t)).
Substituting this into the labor market condition (12) with (27), we can determine the in-
novation ow for lagging country B as
NB(t) =
1
1 + 
 
LKB(t)  LKA(t) : (29)
Equation (29) shows that the innovation ow in the lagging country NB(t) increases with
domestic knowledge stock KB(t) but decreases with foreign knowledge stock KA(t): To
ensure that the lagging country also innovates in equilibrium, i.e., NB(t) > 0; by (29), it
must hold that
 >
KA(t)
KB(t)
: (30)
This condition means that the international technological gapKA(t)=KB(t) is not very large.
Since, by assumption, KA(t) > KB(t); (30) implies
 > 1: (31)
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Lemma 3 The economy falls in the NorthNorth regime if and only if  > KA(t)=KB(t) >
1; in which both countries innovate and only the lagging country produces goods.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 3 shows that if and only if leading countryAs technological advantage,KA(t)=KB(t);
is not excessively large (condition (30)), then lagging country B can innovate in equilibrium
by using the wage di¤erential, which, as described above, exists in equilibrium so long as the
fundamental protability  of innovation is su¢ ciently large (condition (31)).
Using a numerical exercise, we examine how likely it is that the parameter condition (31)
holds. From (15), the fundamental protability of innovation is more likely to exceed 1 if
consumers time preference rate  is higher and/or the markup ratio for monopoly rms
1=(1   ) is higher. As already discussed, the length of one period in our model is fairly
long (around 20 years), meaning that the time preference rate would be signicantly lower
than a standard value such as 0:98: Roughly, let us consider  = 0:7(' (0:98)20), in which
case the condition becomes 1=(1  ) > 2:427: This is higher than the industry average but
is included in the estimates by Hall (1986), who nds that in many industries, the markup
ratio is above 1:5; and in some industries in the US between 1949 and 1978, it was higher
than 2:5. One may think that although the condition  > 1 holds for a moderate range of
parameter values, it is not very likely.
Along with Lemmata 13, we demonstrate when and how the economy falls within a
particular regime, which could be compared to reality as follows. Countries in the North
North regime could be related to developed countries, given the reality of higher R&D
expenditure in developed countries. Countries in the (full) NorthSouth regime could also
be seen as developed and developing countries, given the standard consideration that a
developed country has a higher income than a developing country. Note that in our model,
the leading Norths national income is typically higher than the lagging Souths.29
Finally, we prove that leapfrogging may take place in equilibrium. To achieve this, we
suppose that country A retains leadership for two consecutive periods in the North-North
regime. That is,  > KA(s)=KB(s) > 1 holds for two periods, s = t and t  1: This implies
that spillovers MB(t) are equal to NA(t   1) = LKA(t   1) because innovations developed
by country A in period t  1 all ow to lagging country B:
By substituting (28) and (29) into (9), with MA(t) = 0 and MB(t) = LKA(t   1); the
growth of knowledge follows
KA(t+ 1) = LKA(t)| {z }
NA(t): domestic innovation
+KA(t); (32)
KB(t+ 1) =
LKB(t)  LKA(t)
1 + | {z }
NB(t): domestic innovation
+
L
L+ 1
KA(t)| {z }
MB(t): spillovers
+ KB(t): (33)
In (33), lagging country B has two sources of knowledge growth, namely, domestic innovation
NB(t) and spillovers from foreign innovationMB(t); which sharply contrast with the North
29See Appendix B (not for publication) for the formal proof. In Appendix B, we also derive growth rates in
the three regimes, which are all di¤erent in general. Specically, the growth rate in the NorthNorth regime
can be higher or lower than the rates in other regimes, depending on the parameters and international
technology ratio  (t).
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South regime, wherein the lagging country does not innovate. By combining (32) and (33),
we derive the international dynamics of knowledge as
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
L
L+1
 (t) +
 
L
1+
+ 1
 ; (34)
given 0:5 <  (s) < 
1+
for s = t; t  1; which is equivalent to 1 < KA(t)=KB(t) < :
Using (34), the following theorem formally proves the perpetual cycle of leapfrogging as
an equilibrium phenomenon.
Theorem 3 (Leapfrogging cycles with higher protability) Suppose that the funda-
mental protability of an innovation  exceeds 1 and that the international technological
gap KA(s)=KB(s) is lower than  for s = t; t   1: Then, under dynamic optimization
by the innitely lived agent, both the leading and lagging countries innovate in equilibrium
(NorthNorth regime). In this case, neither country may successfully retain its technologi-
cal leadership for innite sequential periods; i.e., leapfrogging may take place repeatedly and
perpetually along an equilibrium path. Specically, this occurs if and only if
 2

2 (L+ 1)
1 + 
; 1

: (35)
Proof. First, by Lemma 3,  > KA(s)=KB(s) > 1 ensures that both countries innovate
but only the lagging country produces goods. The steady state of system (34) is uniquely
given by
  =
1

L+ 1
1 + 
;
which is stable. The steady state  is less than 0:5 if and only if (35) holds. Then, if and only
if   < 0:5; given (34),  (t) will stably decrease and eventually fall below 0:5; where country
A loses its technological leadership. This means that when country A has leadership for two
periods (t and t   1), it can never retain its leadership for an innite number of sequential
periods if and only if (35) holds. In other words, technological leadership is always temporary.
By symmetry, it is straightforward to show the opposite case where country B initially has
leadership for two periods. This proves the perpetual occurrence of leapfrogging, taking into
account the fact that when a country initially has leadership for only one period, it either
retains leadership for two periods or is immediately leapfrogged.
By combining Theorems 13, we reach our main result as follows:
Corollary 1 If and only if (35) holds, the economy will eventually experience leapfrogging
and its cycles along an equilibrium path for any initial condition on (KA(t); KB(t)).
Proof. For su¢ ciency: If (35) holds,  > 1= and  > 1 must hold. Since  > 1; by
Lemmata 2 and 3, the economy falls within the full NorthSouth regime or the NorthNorth
regime. In the case where the economy is in the full NorthSouth regime (i.e.,KA(t)=KB(t) >
), since  > 1=; a path of KA(t)=KB(t) eventually becomes below ; entering the North
North regime (Theorem 2). In the case where the economy is in the NorthNorth regime
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(i.e.,  > KA(t)=KB(t)), since (35) holds, leapfrogging eventually occurs (Theorem 3). For
necessity: If (35) does not hold, leapfrogging does not occur, regardless of whether  > 1
(see Theorems 2 and 3) or  < 1 (see Theorem 1).
One notable feature in the main result is that (35) is the necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tion for leapfrogging to occur in equilibrium. Therefore, it would be fruitful to discuss the
economic implications of this condition in further detail. Condition (35) is more likely to
hold if the spillovers  are more e¢ cient, if the country size L is smaller, and/or if the fun-
damental protability of innovation  is larger. It is straightforward that the possibility of
leapfrogging is increased by a rise in the e¢ ciency of spillovers . More importantly, even if
the lagging country can learn from the leading countrys innovations with the same e¢ ciency
with which the leading country itself learns (i.e.,  = 1), leapfrogging may not always occur.
The key parameters are L and ; which relate to the two engines of knowledge accumula-
tion, as explained below: country size L relates to learning from foreign innovationsand
fundamental protability  relates to domestic innovations.
To explain the role of country size L; we rewrite the spillovers the lagging country receives
as
MB(t) = NA(t  1) = LKA(t  1) = LK
A(t)
L+ 1| {z }
KA(t 1)
;
where the last equality comes from (28).30 The essential element here is that the lagging
country learns from the past innovations made by leading country A; NA(t  1); which are
manufactured in the present period t. The term 1
L+1
captures the fact that the leading
countrys knowledge grows at the rate of L + 1 through KA(t) = (L + 1)KA(t   1): As
the country size L is large, the leaders innovations grow more sharply from t   1 to t;
the intertemporal gap KA(t)  KA(t   1) is also larger. This intertemporal gap creates an
intercountry gap of knowledge accumulation: while the leading country can learn from its
current innovation NA(t) = LKA(t); the lagging country can only learn from the leaders
past innovation NA(t 1) = LKA(t)
L+1
; which is depreciated by the growth rate L+1:When the
country size L is large, this depreciation is also large, reducing the chance of leapfrogging.
Next, we explain the role of fundamental protability : Regardless of the e¢ ciency
of the spillovers , leapfrogging cannot take place if  < 1: This limit reects the fact
that the lagging country does not innovate for itself if  < 1. That is, the spillovers
from foreign innovations alone can never bring about leapfrogging. Coexistence of domestic
innovation and learning from foreign innovation is essential in the lagging country, which is
the case in equilibrium if  > 1: However, even in this case, leapfrogging does not occur
when  is not su¢ ciently large to satisfy (35). When  becomes su¢ ciently large, the
lagging country responds by developing more innovations (see (33)), while the leading country
does not change its equilibrium behavior because it has already developed innovations at a
maximum (see (32)). For a su¢ ciently large ; leapfrogging becomes inevitable. Note that
  =(1  ) is increasing in the time preference rate  and the markup 1=(1  ): That
is, when consumers are more patient, in that they prefer saving for future consumption (i.e.,
investment in innovation) to current consumption, and/or the monopolist can earn more
30Country A is assumed to be a leading country in period t  1: Since we focus on an identical equilibrium
path, KA(t  1) must satisfy KA(t) = (L+ 1)KA(t  1) by (28), given KA(t):
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from an innovation owing to a higher markup, the lagging country innovates more actively
in equilibrium, resulting in a higher possibility of leapfrogging.
Thus far, we have characterized the cyclical occurrence of leapfrogging with four para-
meters, ; ; L; and : Finally, we briey discuss how these relate to policy. Subjective
time preference  and country size L should be seen as core parameters in the present con-
text; from the descriptive perspective, leapfrogging cycles exist in equilibrium if and only
if consumers are su¢ ciently patient and the country size is su¢ ciently small for the above-
mentioned reason. The spillover e¢ ciency  is naturally related to the so-called absorptive
capability (Cohen and Levinthal 1989) of rms in the host country to FDI, consistent with
the empirical evidence that spillovers through FDI increase with the host country rmsde-
gree of absorptive capability (see, for example, Borenszteina, Gregorio, and Lee 1998). In the
empirical literature, the absorptive capability of a host country is often measured by its stock
of human capital, which crucially depends on a countrys educational system. In addition,
absorptive ability depends on literacy and foreign language skills (Rogers 2004). Thus, we
may relate the spillover parameter  to general and foreign language education policy; the
government would be able to raise  by investing more in education, for instance, through
a lump-sum tax, which increases the possibility of leapfrogging in our model. In a di¤erent
context, we may relate the markup ratio 1=(1   ) to patent protection. Following the op-
timal patent policy literature (Gilbert and Shapiro 1990), we focus on a patents breadth,
interpreted as the patentees ability to raise price, as a measure of patent protection. To
formally model patent breadth, we need another parameter denoting an upper bound on the
markup; see, for example, Li (2001), Goh and Oliver (2002), Chu (2011), and Iwaisako and
Futagami (2013) for research in this line. With this limitation in mind, we consider that a
higher markup ratio 1=(1 ) captures a larger patent breadth. Hence, a tightening of patent
protection in the sense of a larger patent breadth increases rmsprot, which encourages
the lagging country to innovate more actively, raising the possibility of leapfrogging.
We summarize the implication of our result as a proposition.
Proposition 1 An economy will eventually experience leapfrogging and its cycles over time
if and only if (a) the consumers are patient and prefer saving to current consumption, (b) the
countrys size is small, (c) the e¢ ciency of international knowledge spillovers is reasonably
high, and (d) the markup ratio is high. Condition (c) could be related to a larger absorptive
capability of rms, while condition (d) could be related to stronger patent protection.
The key driving force behind leapfrogging cycles is a lagging countrys dual growth engine.
In the NorthNorth regime, the lagging country both innovates and manufactures. Thus,
the lagging countrys knowledge accumulates not only through its own innovations but also
through the ow of spillovers from the leading countrys innovations. In this sense, the
growth engine of knowledge in the lagging country is twofold: innovating autonomously
and learning from abroad. Although the leading country innovates faster than the lagging
country, knowledge growth in the leading country is driven only by domestic innovations,
which creates the possibility of leapfrogging. This mechanism of leapfrogging works under
(35) and is enhanced by the four factors, (a)(d), in Proposition 1.
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3.4 An illustration
To illustrate, we again use a phase diagram. However, the conguration of the phase diagram
depends on the history, i.e., which country was a leading country in the previous period. As
this is simply a problem of visual complication, to clarify the illustration, we assume that
innovation activities are completed within one period. Thus, the innovation value in (6)
should be replaced by
V i(t) = maxfA(t); B(t)g   wi(t)ki(t): (36)
In this modied setting, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the North-North (full
North-South) regime given in Lemma 3 (Lemma 2) is simplied to  >  (t) > 0:5 ( (t) >
 > 0:5). Recall that  is the parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution. Then,
we can describe the international dynamics of knowledge as follows.31
 (t+ 1) = ( (t)) 
8>>>><>>>>:
L+(1 L) (t)
1+(1+)L(1  (t)) for  (t) 2 (0; 1  )
( (1 ))L+(1+(1 )L) (t)
L+1+L(1  (t)) for  (t) 2 (1  ; 0:5)
(L+ 1)  (t)
1+L+L (t)
for  (t) 2 (0:5; )
(L+ 1)  (t)
1+(1+)L (t)
for  (t) 2 (; 1)
: (37)
The equilibrium dynamic system  is autonomous and nonlinear. Figure 2 depicts the
phase diagram of system  for  < 2(1   ). There are two steady states, both of which
are stable. For all initial points, technological leadership can never alternate internationally.
In this case of  < 2(1   ) where the spillovers are less e¢ cient (small ), the result is
essentially identical to that in the NorthSouth regime; that is, no leapfrogging takes place.
There are two subcases with (a)  < (1   )= and (b) (1   )= < : In case (a),
even if the advantage of the leading country is initially very small ( (t) is around 0:5), the
knowledge gap steadily widens and the world economy nally converges to the steady state
( i ) in the full NorthSouth regime. The two countries, even though both innovate initially,
will eventually split into innovative and non-innovative countries, in which the outcome is
ultimately determined by the initial (small) knowledge di¤erence. In case (b),  (t) converges
to the steady state ( i ), in which case both countries innovate in the long run.
Most importantly, Figure 3 depicts a typical path for the case in which  > 2(1   ).
Given that no steady state exists, the international knowledge fraction  (t) will perpetually
move back and forth between the two regimes (0; 0:5) and (0:5; 1). Finally, note that the
condition of leapfrogging cycles in the simplied model,  > 2(1  ); is analogous to (35).
4 Discussion
As previously mentioned, albeit tangentially, our paper has several limitations that arise from
the models specication. First, specialization takes place in the present model, which is a
dynamic version of the Ricardian model. In reality, the leading country also manufactures
foreign innovations (those in the lagging country) and may also learn from them. In addi-
tion, historically, no country has specialized in R&D. Therefore, this model captures only
31See Appendix A for the derivations.
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a certain aspect of real-world behavior. That is, lagging countries may have an advantage
in international technological competition with the leading country because they can learn
from the leaders active innovation as well as their own innovation experience. We can easily
remove this unrealistic aspect concerning specialization from the model by assuming, for
instance, a strictly concave production function in manufacturing. As this would make the
analysis intractable without adding new insights, we adopt the present setting for simplicity.
Second, given the historical fact that technological leadership has often shifted between
countries, it is important to provide an extended case comprising more than two countries.
We can demonstrate that three or more countries on an equilibrium path can perpetually ex-
perience various forms of leapfrogging, including, for example, growth miracles (Matsuyama
2007), in which the least productive country leapfrogs all rival countries having higher pro-
ductivity levels in a single burst. Such growth miracles may take place sporadically or
consecutively or in some complex combination; see Furukawa (2012) for a formal analysis.
Third, to clearly explain the mechanism through which leapfrogging occurs along an
equilibrium path, we assume that countries are basically homogeneous. Allowing for country
heterogeneity, we can demonstrate that leapfrogging may take place nite times in the model
where countries have di¤erent labor endowments and/or e¢ ciency levels of spillovers.32
Fourth, because the model assumes discrete time, it is implicitly assumed that the leading
country takes a long time to exploit its technological advantage, a delay that allows the
lagging country to leapfrog it. One may wonder why the leading country waits so long. The
simple answer is that, in each period, rms in the leading country only pursue a one-period
monopoly; thus, they do not worry about whether the leadership of their home country
persists. For example, if we introduce into the model a welfare-maximizing government that
gives subsidies to innovating rms, a policy game between international governments may
lead to a di¤erent situation where the leading country does not wait so long. However,
because innovations often take a very long time from startup to implementation and emerge
in bunches,33 asymmetric information prevents the government in the leading country from
seeing in real time what is happening in the lagging country. Given this, the leading country
can only wait and see what happens in the lagging country.
Of course, it is potentially necessary to extend our discrete-time analysis to continuous
time. In a continuous-time setting, it is essential to consider what happens as the technology
levels of two countries become equal in the process of leapfrogging. One way forward would
be to focus on technological complementarity between countries. Spillovers from the leading
country then combine with the backward technology of the lagging country, meaning that our
leapfrogging mechanism should work in a continuous-time setting. We leave this fundamental
issue associated with discrete time for future research.
Fifth, we should revisit the lack of factors such as stochastic innovation, costly adoption
of innovation, and strategic interactions, which should be a limiting factor in a broader
context. As we previously mentioned, if we implement a very simple setting, we can consider
a stochastic innovation process or a costly adoption process without essentially changing the
results.34 Meanwhile, although an introduction of stochastic timing of innovation or strategic
32The formal analysis is available from the author upon request.
33This issue is intensively investigated in the literature on innovation cycles (see Shleifer 1986).
34See Appendix C (not for publication).
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interactions between rms could be interesting, it makes the analysis intractable.
Sixth, we consider FDI ows as the only spillover channel. In the model, FDI is allowed
to ow in both directions but takes place only from the leader to the laggard in equilibrium;
as a result, knowledge ows in that direction only. One might regard this equilibrium
characteristic of one-way knowledge spillovers as unrealistic, given that the two countries
are identical except for their knowledge stock for innovation. However, if we allowed a
more general spillover function, including laggard-to-leader knowledge spillovers, our main
mechanism would not cease and the results would still hold under original condition (35)
with one extra condition. Specically, we can extend the model by adding spillovers that
are not based on FDI to the present setting. In such an extended model, knowledge ows in
both directions in equilibrium; under (35), we can demonstrate that leapfrogging occurs if
the e¢ ciency of non-FDI spillovers is not very large.35 Therefore, we can say that our simple
specication on spillovers in (8) captures a general aspect of the leapfrogging phenomenon.
Finally, the mechanism of leapfrogging cycles shown here is endogenous in that it de-
pends on an endogenous process of knowledge accumulation, which is based on Romers
(1990) setting. However, it should be noted that it is not endogenous in a strict sense
since the knowledge accumulation process we consider does not explicitly incorporate any
economic incentive or prot motive but rather assumes externalities of past innovations on
current technological productivity, so that the learning mechanism itself is essentially ex-
ogenous. In a complete model of fully endogenous leapfrogging cycles, we would consider
voluntary investment activity by rms to learn from foreign innovations; we leave this for
future research.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a two-region endogenous innovation model with dynamic opti-
mization of the innitely lived consumer, in which knowledge di¤uses internationally through
FDI. The major nding is that technological leadership may shift internationally, perpetu-
ally moving back and forth between countries if the protability of an innovation is higher
and the spillovers are relatively e¢ cient. Specically, if the protability of an innovation is
lower, in equilibrium, only the leading country innovates. In this case, leapfrogging never
arises. If the protability of an innovation is higher, in equilibrium, both countries innovate.
In this case, leapfrogging perpetually takes place along an equilibrium path if international
spillovers are reasonably e¢ cient. In a big picture, we may say that the growth process of
an international economy can be intrinsically cyclical depending on the factors such as the
protability of innovation and the e¢ ciency of international spillovers.
Our result shows the possibility that lagging countries leapfrog in spite of innovating less,
by focusing on learning from foreign innovation as a missing link. In this sense, the present
paper is close to Glass (1999) in spirit. With some examples from Asian countries including
South Korea or China,36 Glass (1999) considers whether learning from foreign innovation
through imitation can serve as a stepping stone enabling rms from lagging countries to
undertake innovation. The present paper extends Glasss (1999) view by demonstrating that
35We show this in Appendix C (not for publication).
36See Carolan, Singh, and Talati (1998).
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the e¤ectiveness of learning may be a key factor in enabling the lagging country to leapfrog
the leading country by shifting to a more innovative economy.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemmata 13. The necessity has been shown in the text. Namely,  < 1
must hold if both countries produce, recalling that only the leading country innovates in
equilibrium if both countries manufacture. Here, we prove su¢ ciency, i.e., both coun-
tries produce in equilibrium if  < 1: For this purpose, let us prove the contrapositive:
we show  > 1 must hold if only one country manufactures. There are two cases. (a)
If only leading country A manufactures in equilibrium, wA(t) < wB(t) must hold. With
KA(t) > KB(t); this implies wA(t)=KA(t) < wB(t)=KB(t); under which only leading coun-
try A innovates owing to its lower R&D cost. There is no labor demand in country B, so
(a) cannot be an equilibrium. (b) If only lagging country B manufactures in equilibrium,
wA(t) > wB(t) must hold. Case (b) has three sub-cases. (b-i) Only lagging country B
innovates, which is inconsistent for the same reason as in (a). (b-ii) If only leading coun-
try A innovates in equilibrium, wA(t)=KA(t) < wB(t)=KB(t) must hold. The labor market
condition (12) implies NA(t) = LKA(t) and wB(t) = (1  )E(t)=L:37 The free-entry con-
dition requires V A(t) = 0 because innovation takes place in equilibrium for country A;
which implies wA(t) = KA(t)E(t)=N(t + 1):38 Noting N(t + 1) = NA(t) in this case,
wA(t) > wB(t) implies  > 1; not  < 1: (b-iii) If both countries innovate in equilibrium,
it must be by the free entry condition that V A(t) = V B(t) = 0 in equilibrium, which im-
plies wA(t)=KA(t) = wB(t)=KB(t) = E(t)
N(t+1)
:39 Using this and xB(t) = (1 )E(t)
N(t)wB(t)
from (4),
NB(t) =
 
KB(t) KA(t)L=(1 + ) is derived from (12). Since NB(t) > 0; then  > 1
must hold, noting KA(t) > KB(t): We have proven that if  < 1; both countries must
manufacture in equilibrium; thus, only the leader innovates. We can easily prove Lemmata
2 and 3 in an analogous way (see Appendix B (not for publication) for a formal proof).
Derivations for (37)
In the NorthNorth regime: there are two cases (A) and (B). (A) Assume 
1  >
KA(t)
KB(t)
> 1
(i.e.,  (t) 2 (0:5; )), where country A is a leading country. The free-entry condition (27)
becomes
E(t)
NA(t) +NB(t)
=
wi(t)
Ki(t)
: (A1)
Given the labor condition for leading country A, we have
NA(t) = LKA(t): (A2)
By the labor condition for the lagging country, L =
 
NB(t)=KB(t)

+
 
NA(t) +NB(t)

xB(t);
with xB(t) = (1 )E(t)
(NA(t)+NB(t))wB(t)
; we thus have
NB(t) = LKB(t)  (1  )LKA(t); (A3)
37By (2), we can derive xB(t) = (1  )E(t)=(N(t)wB(t)): Substituting this into L = N(t)xB(t) yields
this expression.
38By (5),B(t) = E(t+1)=N(t+1): Incorporating this and (3) into (6), V A(t) = 0 implies this expression.
39Note (6), together with B(t) = E(t)N(t) from (5), 
B(t) > A(t), and (3).
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in which wB(t) is eliminated using (A1). Noting MB(t) = NA(t) here, by (9), we have the
dynamic system as follows:
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
L (t) + L+ 1
for  (t) 2 (0:5; ) : (A4)
Note that  > 0:5 holds in the NorthNorth regime. (B) Assume 1 

< K
A(t)
KB(t)
< 1 (i.e.,
 (t) 2 (1  ; 0:5)), where country B is a leading country. Due to the symmetry,
NA(t) = LKA(t)  (1  )LKB(t) and NB(t) = LKB(t) (A5)
hold. We can also derive
 (t+ 1) =
( + (  1))L+ (1 + (1  )L) (t)
L+ 1 + L (1   (t)) for  (t) 2 (1  ; 0:5) : (A6)
In the full NorthSouth regime, there are two cases (C) and (D). (C) Assume K
A(t)
KB(t)
>

1  > 1 (i.e.,  (t) 2 (; 1)). The leading country innovates following
NA(t) = LKA(t) and NB(t) = 0: (A7)
The lagging country receives spillovers MB(t) = NA(t); with   1:40 Then, the knowledge
dynamics are as follows:
 (t+ 1) =
(L+ 1) (t)
1 + (1 + )L (t)
for  (t) 2 (; 1) : (A8)
(D) Assume K
A(t)
KB(t)
< 1 

< 1 (i.e.,  (t) 2 (0; 1  )). Due to the symmetry, NA(t) = 0 and
NB(t) = LKB(t); with MA(t) = NB(t): We can easily have
 (t+ 1) =
L+ (1  L) (t)
1 + (1 + )L (1   (t)) for  (t) 2 (0; 1  ) : (A9)
40By using the labor market condition for lagging country B and the free-entry condition, we can easily
verify that
AA(t)
AB(t)
>
wA(t)
wB(t)
=

1   > 1
holds.
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